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Executive Summary
Since the enactment of Medicaid in 1965, states have had the option of offering
beneficiaries enrollment in managed care arrangements.  With the advent of
mandatory managed care reaching millions of beneficiaries (including a growing
proportion of disabled recipients), the amount and scope of litigation involving
Medicaid managed care plans can be expected to grow.  A review of the current
litigation regarding Medicaid managed care reveals two basic types of lawsuits: (1)
those that challenge the practices of managed care companies under various federal
and state laws that safeguard consumer rights, protect health care quality, and prohibit
discrimination; and (2) suits that assert claims arising directly under the Medicaid
statute and implementing regulations, as well as claims related to Constitutional
safeguards that undergird the program.
Lawsuits asserting claims arising under Medicaid tend to raise two basic questions: (1)
the extent to which enrollment in a Medicaid managed care plan alters existing
Medicaid beneficiary rights and state agency duties under federal or state Medicaid
law; and (2) the extent to which managed care companies, as agents of the state, act
under “color of law” (i.e., undertaking to perform official duties or acting with the
imprimatur of state authority).
Additionally, states might see an increase in litigation brought by prospective and
current contractors who assert that they have been wrongfully denied contracts or
improperly penalized for poor performance.  These assertions may involve claims that
are grounded in federal and state law, the Medicaid statute, and the Constitution.
Moreover, in light of the consumer protection elements of the managed care reforms
contained in the Balanced Budget Act, future managed care litigation may focus on
the manner in which companies carry out states’ obligations toward managed care
enrollees.
2Resolution of Medicaid managed care cases involves the application of general principles of
administrative and regulatory law.  Thus, Medicaid managed care cases have implications for
other public purchasers of managed care arrangements, including state mental health and
alcohol and substance abuse agencies.
A Note on This Issue Brief
This Issue Brief is intended as one of several in the Managed Behavioral Health Care Issue Brief
Series that deals with managed behavioral health care from a purely legal point of view.
Indeed, the Issue Brief Series is designed in part to draw attention of the behavioral health
care community to important judicial developments that are shaping public managed health
care systems.  While many legal decisions discussed do not include factual patterns involving
mental health and/or substance abuse per se, they are included because of the nature of the
law(s) they interpret, because they could apply with equal force to managed behavioral
health care situations, or because they have implications for several public programs (e.g.,
Medicare, Medicaid, Tri-Care/CHAMPUS, etc.).  It is important to keep in mind that while
similar factual patterns can lead to different legal outcomes depending on the particular
law(s) implicated (e.g., legal protections for Medicaid beneficiaries are different from those
for persons whose care is paid for by a block grant program), in some instances factual
patterns cut across various laws and the legal outcomes of two similar but separate cases
may be the same (e.g., an unlawful procurement under Medicaid may be an unlawful
procurement under a block grant program because the Department of Health and Human
Services grants management regulations govern both types of procurements).
Because a multitude of different laws and stakeholders are implicated by the intersection of
managed care and publicy-financed health care, this Series will include other Issue Briefs on
the law.  For example, future Issue Briefs will focus on Medicare, the Americans With
Disabilities Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.  Additionally, there is
a forthcoming Issue Brief on the new Balanced Budget Act regulations promulgated by the
Health Care Financing Administration.  Although we realize that any given fact pattern or
case can involve more than one of the above laws, we decided for the sake of organization
to dedicate an Issue Brief to each law in turn.
As you consider even the non-behavioral health care cases outlined below, keep in mind
that they may have direct implications for mental health and substance abuse agencies and
services, because these judicial opinions clarify the legal rights and responsibilities of public
agencies, managed care organizations, and consumers of publicy-sponsored health care.
Introduction
Medicaid managed care litigation is nearly as old as the Medicaid program itself.  Since the
enactment of Medicaid in 1965, states have had the option of offering beneficiaries
voluntary enrollment in managed care arrangements.1  With the advent of mandatory
                                                
1 In the early days of the program, prior to enactment of the Medicaid health maintenance organization
amendments of 1976, these arrangements were termed prepaid health plans and competitive medical plans.
See David F. Chavkin and Anne Treseder, “California’s Prepaid Health Plan Program: Can the Patient be
Saved?” 28 Hastings  L.J. 685 (1977).
3managed care, first through federal demonstration authority beginning in the early 1980s,2
and more recently as a state plan option,3 Medicaid managed care has become
commonplace.  As Medicaid managed care grows--and particularly as managed care systems
reach disabled and medically vulnerable populations with significant health care needs--
policy-makers can expect an increase in cases raising coverage, access, and quality claims.
Because managed care combines health care coverage with a contractual duty to furnish
health care, the types of litigation that can arise against managed care companies actually
exceeds those that were commonplace under the traditional program.  And as is probably
true in any maturing health care system, the more common Medicaid managed care
becomes, the more common litigation will become.
Nonetheless, the litigation up to this point regarding Medicaid managed care can be summed
up in three legal principles: State Medicaid agencies retain ultimate responsibility for
providing health care services sufficient in scope to achieve Medicaid’s intended purpose;
the potential liability of Medicaid agencies for failure to provide sufficient services is not
only statutory in nature--it is also Constitutional in nature, and therefore sometimes beyond
Congress’ ability to take away; and generally speaking, as far as the courts are concerned,
private health care companies providing services to Medicaid beneficiaries are acting as
agents of the states and their actions will be viewed as state actions.
Indeed, companies that furnish managed health care services to Medicaid beneficiaries
assume various legal obligations which apply to their operations regardless of who buys the
managed health care services--Medicaid agencies, state mental health agencies, employers
which buy insurance for their employees, and even employers who self-insure.4  For
example, state law may create broad consumer protections, which apply across the board to
companies that sell insurance, including health maintenance organization (HMO) plans and
other forms of managed care.  Depending on how they are drafted, laws may create
individual rights on the part of current or prospective health care recipients to sue a
company for legal violations.5  Similarly, a managed care company may face legal challenges
to the quality of its health care services under state tort law from any recipient,6 including
                                                
2 Sections 1115 and 1915(b) of the Social Security Act have both been used over the past two decades to
establish mandatory managed care systems.  See generally Congressional Research Services, Medicaid Source Book
(GPO, Washington, DC 1993); S. Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of
Medicaid Managed Care Contracts (2d ed.) (The George Washington University Medical Center, Center for Health
Policy Research, Washington, DC 1998).
3 Section 1932(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)) as added by the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.
4 The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts certain types of claims that arise
under state laws.  ERISA preemption can occur in the case of self-insured employee benefit plan arrangements
as well as those that involve the purchase of insurance.  At the same time, in recent years, courts have
identified certain types of claims against managed care companies, even in the case of self-insured employee
health benefit plans, that survive ERISA preemption.  Rand Rosenblatt, Sylvia Law, and Sara Rosenbaum, Law
and the American Health Care System (Foundation Press, Old Westbury, NY 1997; 1998 Supplement) (Chs.
2(C) and (3)(H)).
5 See, e.g., Broughton v Cigna Health Plans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1998), holding that
California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, which prohibits deceptive advertising practices, precludes insurers
from using mandatory arbitration clauses to compel arbitration in a case seeking injunctive relief against
deceptive practices.
6 Ardary v Aetna Healthplans of California, Inc., 98 F.3rd 496 (9th Cir. 1996); Wickline v State of California, 228
Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Wilson v Blue Cross of Southern California, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App.
4Medicaid beneficiaries, although studies suggest that as a general matter, poor persons may
be less likely to file medical malpractice lawsuits.7  Finally, certain federal laws, such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act, create individually enforceable legal rights that apply
regardless of whether a company’s services are purchased by a Medicaid agency or some
other purchaser.  In short, managed care companies which provide Medicaid services can
expect to face legal challenges by beneficiaries, health care providers, and other stakeholders
based on federal and state laws which apply generally to all managed care plans irrespective
of the source of the managed health care premiums.
At the same time, the Medicaid statute, and the implementing regulations and federal
Constitutional principles on which the law rests, may directly give rise to claims against
managed care companies, as well as against the state Medicaid agencies on whose behalf the
companies administer managed care plans.  As with tort claims, such lawsuits may be
brought by beneficiaries, providers, and other Medicaid stakeholders who allege that their
legal rights under federal and state Medicaid law have been violated by one or more
company practices.  Moreover, Medicaid managed care plans themselves, as well as managed
care companies which seek the right to participate in a state Medicaid program, may also
have legal rights against state agencies that arise under federal or state Medicaid law as well
as Constitutional due process principles.
The earliest Medicaid managed care litigation involved claims of consumer fraud directed at
managed care companies for fraudulent and deceptive marketing practices, coercion, and
other unfair trade practices.  However, this early litigation also raised claims that were
aimed at state Medicaid agencies themselves and alleged violation of federal and state law as
a result of their general failure to oversee the quality of care and conduct of the plans.
These early lawsuits were concentrated in California and most of the suits were pending at
the time that federal and state Medicaid agencies and business and insurance regulators
stepped in to shut down the 1970s generation of prepaid health plans.8  As a result, there
are virtually no court decisions to review from this first generation of Medicaid managed
care litigation.
With the emergence of mandatory managed care has come a new generation of lawsuits.
Not surprisingly, some of the earliest cases arose in Arizona, which operates what is
probably the nation’s most mature Medicaid managed care system, having been in place for
more than 15 years.  The managed care system in Arizona has also given rise to parallel
forms of litigation involving the Medicare program, again a testament to the maturity of the
market.
The number and frequency of Medicaid managed care cases, which often raise complex
questions of administrative law, can probably be expected to grow in scope and depth for
two reasons.  First, managed care has become a principal means of providing health care to
millions of Medicaid beneficiaries.  As a result, managed care systems have become directly
involved in coverage determinations, a historic area of Medicaid litigation because of the
                                                                                                                                                
1990).
7 See Sylvia Law and Steven Polan, “Pain and Profit: The Politics of Malpractice,” (Harper and Row, NY
1978); Dana Hughes, Sara Rosenbaum, David Smith, and Cynthia Fader, “Obstetrical Care for Low-Income
Women: The Effects of Medical Malpractice on Community Health Centers,” Institute of Medicine, Medical
Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care, Vol. II, (National Academy Press, Washington, DC 1989).
8 Can the Patient be Saved?, supra note 1.
5enforceable rights that the statute creates,9 as well as in the delivery of care.  Second, state
Medicaid agencies have a legal duty to administer their programs (including the managed
care components of their programs) in accordance with state and federal law.  Emerging
court decisions suggest that courts view companies as administrative contractors acting
under “color of law”.  Taken together, judicial decisions to date reflect courts’ conclusion
that state agencies have a duty to ensure compliance with federal law which remains in
effect regardless of whether the agency directly administers its program or contracts for
administrative services on a risk basis.10  Furthermore, where a company’s practices conflict
with laws that state officials either knew or should have known made such conduct
unlawful, such officials may be liable in their individual capacities for damages proximately
caused by the improper conduct.11
Thus, for example, the court in J.K. v Dillenberg,12 a case involving the termination of
mental health benefits for disabled children, held that managed care contractors are not
simply private providers but instead act under color of law and are legally liable (along with
the state agency itself) for violations of federal fair hearing regulations.  These regulations in
turn reflect and codify basic Constitutional principles, embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment, against deprivation of property without due process of law.13   
A Survey of Medicaid Managed Care Cases
Managed care cases involving claims by Medicaid beneficiaries can be grouped into several
basic categories, none of which is exclusive.  That is, any one lawsuit can raise several issues
at the same time, some of which arise under Medicaid, and some of which arise under other
laws.
1. Cases involving the basic legality of a mandatory managed care program, which limits beneficiaries’
choice of provider
                                                
9 See cases cited in Law and the American Health Care System, supra note 4, Ch. 2(H).  The scope of what is
considered a legally enforceable individual right under federal law has changed considerably following the
decisions in Wilder v Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) and Suter v Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
However, because Medicaid creates a legally enforceable entitlement to certain services among eligible persons,
courts continue to consider major portions of the statute to be legally enforceable by individuals.  See
discussion of recent Medicaid case law developments in Law and the American Health Care System, supra note 4,
Ch. 2(H).
10 Indeed, since the inception of Medicaid, state agencies have had the authority to contract with private
companies to administer their programs.  42 C.F.R. § 434.20.  This contracting authority has never been held
to alter agencies’ fundamental legal obligations to comply with federal and state statutory and regulatory
requirements.
11 Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. and Michele M. Johnson, “Unseen Peril: Inadequate Enrollee Grievance Protections
in Public Managed Care Programs,” 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 359, 383 (Winter, 1998).  State officials are protected by
the doctrine of qualified immunity where they act in good faith.  The good faith standard is an objective one
that “requires compliance with all laws of which the defendant could reasonably be expected to have
knowledge.”  Id.
12 836 F. Supp. 694 (D. Ariz. 1993).
13 Unseen Peril, supra note 11, provides an excellent discussion of the statutory and Constitutional principles
that govern the conduct of state Medicaid agencies and their managed care contractors, as well as cases that
have addressed this issue.
6Beneficiaries and providers have on occasion challenged the legality of the state’s entire
mandatory Medicaid managed care program, citing violations of federal Medicaid law, as
well as federal statutes that permit the Secretary to conduct demonstrations under certain
circumstances.  These cases have generally been unsuccessful, since federal discretion to the
Secretary is very broad.14  Similarly, Medicaid beneficiaries generally have not been
successful in challenging Medicaid managed care programs that limit their choice of
providers.  In RX Pharmacies Plus v Weil,15 a federal district court in Colorado dismissed
claims brought by Medicaid beneficiaries that the Colorado Medicaid managed care plan
violated the Medicaid statute’s “free choice of provider” provisions by not permitting them
to utilize the pharmacy of their choice.16  The court held that once a Medicaid beneficiary
selects an HMO, the Medicaid statute does not require that the beneficiary be permitted to
choose pharmaceutical providers outside the HMO.  The Court also held that the practice
of automatically assigning non-selecting beneficiaries (known as autoassignment or
autoenrollment) to an HMO did not violate Medicaid freedom of choice provisions,
because the beneficiaries still had the choice of staying in the HMO or choosing a different
provider.
In Brinson v Dept. of Public Welfare,17 a similar case brought in Pennsylvania state court, a
Medicaid beneficiary appealed an order by the state’s Secretary of Public Welfare denying a
beneficiary’s request to be excluded from an experimental managed care program.  Ms.
Brinson claimed that she was harmed by involuntary inclusion in the program, because she
was unable to continue treatment with her existing physicians.  The court rejected Brinson’s
argument that the state agency was required by state law to hold a public hearing before
implementing the program.  The court also found that despite not being able to continue
with her existing physicians, Ms. Brinson still had the freedom of choice among the
physicians and specialists covered by the HMO.18
2. Cases that challenge coverage under Medicaid managed care plans
One of the most complex aspects of a Medicaid managed care contract is that it frequently
covers fewer than all services included in a state’s Medicaid plan.19  With respect to
contract services, however, managed care companies are liable to the same extent that
agencies are liable for the unlawful denial, reduction, or termination of care. As a result,
lawsuits that challenge coverage decisions made by managed care companies, like those that
make claims against the procedural protections offered by health plans, will name both the
company and the state (or solely the state) as the defendant(s).  This is done on the theory
that the state has a non-delegable duty to protect the entitlement to coverage created by the
Medicaid statute, and a contractor that administers a plan on the state’s behalf is an agent of
the state acting under color of law.  As a result, state agencies may be liable for allegedly
unlawful denials of coverage regardless of whether the entity actually making the denial is
the state or its managed care contractor.
                                                
14 However, the challengers to a state’s mandatory program were successful in Beno v Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057
(9th Cir. 1994) and Crane v Matthews, 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
15 833 F. Supp. 549 (D. Colo. 1995).
16 The Court also held that the pharmacists who had also brought suit lacked standing to bring a claim under
this provision of the Medicaid Act.
17 163 Pa. Cmwlth. 408 (Pa. 1994).
18 The court’s ruling was based on a Pennsylvania statute guaranteeing freedom of choice.
19 See Negotiating the New Health System, supra note 2.
7In several states, Medicaid beneficiaries have successfully challenged the adequacy of Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) services provided by managed
care companies participating in the state’s Medicaid managed care program.  Most EPSDT
suits have been settled out of court through detailed agreements in which the state ensures
that the managed care company will comply with existing federal EPSDT requirements.20
Such a settlement was recently reached in John B. v Menke,21 a suit brought on behalf of
children enrolled in TennCare, Tennessee’s Medicaid managed care program.  The settlement
establishes specific standards and timetables for compliance with federal outreach
requirements, screening, diagnosis and treatment mandates, requires a case-by-case
determination of medical necessity and provision of all required service, and prohibits
specific managed care cost containment practices that would limit the provision of EPSDT
services.  Furthermore, the settlement requires the state to monitor the managed care
company’s case management operations and track the receipt of EPSDT services and to
conduct sample audits to ensure compliance with the terms of the consent decree.  The
achievement of a comprehensive negotiated settlement like the one in Menke is likely to
become a model for beneficiaries, states, and managed care companies to follow in
attempting to resolve other EPSDT managed care cases.
The Menke settlement illustrates the legal principal that state Medicaid agencies retain
ultimate responsibility for providing health care services sufficient in scope to achieve
Medicaid’s intended purpose, i.e., public access to health care services.  Coverage under
federal Medicaid law is a complex subject which includes many issues: the classes of services
that must be covered (which is determined by the contract); the amount, duration, and
scope limits that may lawfully be applied to covered services and benefits (which also may
be determined by the contract); and the criteria and standards that should be applied in
determining whether a covered service is medically necessary for a particular beneficiary.22
As noted, all of these coverage issues have resulted in Medicaid litigation in the past, and all
can be expected to arise in future litigation involving Medicaid managed care beneficiaries.
3. Due process cases
Courts have interpreted the federal Medicaid law to create a Constitutionally protected
property right based on the “brutal need” that is required to gain welfare eligibility.  Thus,
in situations that involve an individualized factual determination of whether benefits are
due, benefits may not be terminated or reduced without a fair hearing that meets
Constitutional due process requirements.  These requirements include an understandable
notice of agency action with the reasons stated for the action, an opportunity for an
informal hearing before an impartial decision-maker at a “meaningful time” and in a
“meaningful manner”, the opportunity to be represented by counsel, the right to personally
appear and present evidence and to confront and cross examine witnesses, and a final
decision that is in writing and that includes the reasoning underlying the ruling.  Most
                                                
20 EPSDT suits that have been settled with detailed agreements about the provision of services in
Pennsylvania include Scott v Snider, 91-CV-7080 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 1994) and Metts v Houston, 97-CV-4123
(E.D. Pa., March 1998).
21 CV 3-98 0168 (M.D. Tenn., Feb. 1998).
22 For a review of medical necessity issues in Medicaid managed care, see Coverage Decision-Making in Medicaid
Managed Care: Key Issues in Developing Managed Care Contracts (Issue Brief No.1), Managed Behavioral Health
Care Issue Brief Series, Center for Health Policy Research, (Washinton, DC, May, 1998).
8importantly, these principles, which are embodied in Medicaid fair hearing regulations,23
provide that assistance cannot be reduced or terminated in such an instance until a final
decision is reached, if the hearing is requested in a timely fashion.
Currently, state agencies do not contract with private companies to conduct their fair
hearings for them but instead, consistent with the Medicaid statute and regulations, require
only that companies administer grievance systems.  Typically, a managed care company’s
complaint and grievance system may fail to track the federal procedural requirements of the
regulations, and the company may fail to provide continued benefits for beneficiaries who
make a timely request for a hearing.
To date, several cases, including J.K. v Dillenberg, have successfully challenged the legal
sufficiency of grievance systems, holding that states have a non-delegable duty to provide
such hearings prior to termination of coverage.24  As noted, states have attempted to argue
that the denials and reductions are simply the result of private provider conduct and thus do
not constitute agency action.25  Courts have consistently rejected this argument on non-
delegable duty and agency theories.26
4. Medicaid litigation by managed care companies
Federal and state law, as well as Constitutional due process principles, create rights not only
for Medicaid beneficiaries, but for managed care companies, as well.  However, until
recently, federal statutes and regulations generally have provided much more limited due
process protection for companies than those owed to beneficiaries.  Prior to the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), for example, a state could terminate a provider contract
without affording a company a pre-termination hearing.  However, the BBA codifies27 the
holding in Medcare HMO v Bradley,28 in which a federal district court for Illinois found that
the state’s own Medicaid law created a property right in a provider agreement that could
not be terminated without a prior fair hearing and struck down as ultra vires a state contract
that provided for termination “at will” by the state.
Another notable case brought by a managed care company, in this instance against state
mental health and substance abuse administrators, is Value Behavioral Health, Inc. v Ohio
                                                
23 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200-431.246.
24 See Perry v Chen, CIV 95-140 TUC RMB (D. Ariz., August 12, 1996); Daniels v Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305
(M.D. Tenn. 1996), vacated on other grounds; and Daniels v Menke, 1998 WL 211763 (6th Cir., April 22,
1998).
25 The United States Supreme Court in fact reached such a decision in Blum v Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982),
which involved the eviction of nursing home residents by institutions that had determined that they no longer
satisfied the level of care requirements needed to remain in the institution.
26 A similar argument was made by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the case of Medicare
grievances but rejected by the United States Court of Appeals in Grijalva v Shalala, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
18591 (9th Cir.,  Aug. 1998).  Other courts, adhering to the decisions in Medicare cases and rejecting the
private provider theory set forth in Blum v Yaretsky, have held that in many cases private providers in fact
assume the role of the state because of the scope of their administrative duties and thus cannot simply be
viewed as private contractors.  See, e.g., Catanzano v Wing, 103 F.3d 223 (2nd Cir. 1996).
27 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(4)(B).  This provision of the BBA may lead states to write contracts with shorter
terms in order to avoid lengthy and arduous termination battles.  Short-term contracts may, however, reduce
the number of willing plan participants.
28 788 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
9Department of Mental Health.29  After losing a bid to furnish care, VBH sued, claiming that
the state’s bidding process had not been “open and free” as required by federal procurement
regulations.  VBH alleged that the state had (1) accepted the bid of a competing company
which did not meet the requirements of the RFP; (2) disclosed to the competitor the
amount of administrative overhead contained in VBH’s bid; and (3) allowed the competitor
to revise its bid to match VBH’s overhead costs after the closing date for submission of the
proposals.  The court held that federal procurement regulations created enforceable
property interests in potential bidders, and thus enjoined the state from entering into any
contract resulting from a defective bidding process and ordered the appointment of a special
monitor to oversee the new process.30
Future directions for Medicaid managed care litigation
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allows state Medicaid programs to create mandatory
managed care systems for most beneficiaries as a state option and without federal waivers.
At the same time, the law establishes standards and safeguards for state Medicaid programs
that elect to administer state option programs.  The BBA standards address, coverage,
access, enrollment, and quality.31  Federal regulations implementing the BBA are pending as
of September, 1998.  However, while the regulations will provide more definitive answers
to certain questions, the legislation itself is self-executing.  As a result, litigation in “state
option” states for breach of the BBA standards would be permissible regardless of the status
of the regulations, which are expected to be issued only in proposed form.  The extent to
which individuals can enforce the BBA safeguards through direct legal action is unclear and
recent decisions by courts considering Medicaid challenges to state administrative practices
are inconsistent.32  To the degree that the BBA standards are enforceable by individuals,
litigation probably can be expected to arise in the future.
                                                
29 966 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
30 Although the state appealed the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on July 13,
1998 dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the injunction and judgment of the district court.  The
Appellate Court’s order was based on the fact that VBH was purchased by Ohio Behavioral Health
Partnership (OBHP) after the district court’s decision, and OBHP advised the Appellate Court that it no longer
sought to uphold the injunction and did not intend to further pursue the litigation.  The Ohio Department of
Mental Health subsequently advised the Appellate Court that the case was moot and that the appeal should be
dismissed.  While technically the Value Behavioral Health case has no legal significance, it should nonetheless be
noted that at least one court—the district court in Value Behavioral Health—determined that disaffected
potential bidders for state contracts enjoyed enforceable property interests stemming from federal procurement
regulations.  It thus seems likely that other potential bidders for state and local government procurements will
advance the theory used by VBH in the hope of halting allegedly defective bidding processes.  See also Health
Right v Barry, (D.C. Contract App. Bd., 1997), a decision in which the District of Columbia Contract Appeals
Board overturned a Medicaid procurement award because of violations of federal procurement rules, including
the absence of any factual record on which the award was based.
31 For a memorandum summarizing key provisions of the BBA, please contact Sherrida Taylor at the Center
for Health Policy Research at (202) 530-2349.
32 See, e.g., Blessing v Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353 (1997); Harris v James, 883 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1995);
Haymons v Williams, 795 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Steele v Magnant, 796 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ind.
1992); Jordano v Steffen, 787 F. Supp. 886 (D. Minn. 1992); Audette v Sullivan, 19 F.3d 254 (6th Cir. 1994).
